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ABSTRACT
Studies with captive fowl have revealed that they possess greater cog-
nitive capacities than previously thought. We now know that fowl 
have sophisticated cognitive and communicative skills, which had 
hitherto been associated only with certain primates. Several theories 
have been advanced to explain the evolution of such complex behav-
ior. Central to these theories is the enlargement of the brain in species 
with greater mental capacities. Fowl present us with a conundrum, 
however, because they show the behaviors anticipated by the theories 
but do not have the expected changes in the brain. Consequently fowl 
present two challenges of interest to us here. One is a scientific chal-
lenge to explain their remarkable capabilities. The other is an ethical 
challenge regarding our treatment of animals with higher cognitive 
skills.
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1. Introduction
Research with nonhuman animals (including primates, ma-
rine mammals and corvids) has revealed that these social spe-
cies exhibit an array of complex behaviors initially believed 
to be unique to humans, including tool use, problem solving 
and innovation as well as referential and representational com-
munication. Current theories regarding the evolution of these 
seemingly advanced cognitive abilities correlate more com-
plex behavior with increases in brain size, yet recent work with 
captive fowl has demonstrated that they also possess many of 
these same capabilities, but do not have the predicted changes 
in brain size. Chickens therefore present a scientific challenge, 
as well as an ethical one, given their treatment during commer-
cial food production. 
In this paper we will begin by outlining the cognitive ca-
pacities of chickens as revealed in recent experimental work. 
We will then move on to show how the theories currently es-
poused to account for such capacities fail to adequately explain 
the case of chickens. Finally, we examine some of the ethical 
implications of this work, including its relevance to the 3Rs 
that govern experimental research with captive animals. 
2. The cognitive capacities of fowl 
Wild fowl and domestic chickens demonstrate complex cog-
nitive abilities. Fowl communicate using sophisticated vocal 
and visual signals and show remarkable behavioral flexibility 
as well as sensitivity to the attentional states of others during 
social interactions. They also perform abstract and social tran-
sitive inferences. Below we will discuss the significance of 
these capacities as well as the methods used to show that fowl 
possess them.
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Chicken communication is complex, consisting of over 24 
different types of vocalizations as well as visual displays (Col-
lias and Joos 1953). However, the size of the repertoire is not 
its most remarkable feature. Fowl communicate using signals 
that are functionally referential (Evans and Evans 1999; Smith 
and Evans 2008, 2009), and representational (Evans and Evans 
2007). These signals are also individually distinctive, which fa-
cilitates recognition of individuals (Candland 1969) and the use 
of reputation in future social interactions (Pizzari 2003). 
Functionally referential signals convey information about 
external events in an environment in the absence of any other 
contextual cues (the term “functional” acknowledges that the 
underlying cognitive processes are not well understood (Marler 
et al. 1992)). Observational studies, followed by experimental 
manipulation of the signal’s usage, allow researchers to de-
termine the context in which the signals are produced and the 
responses of the receivers. If a tight correlation between the 
specific eliciting event and the receivers’ responses is found, 
the signals can be said to function to convey information about 
the event and potentially even specific information about how 
to respond to the event. 
Functionally referential communication has been identi-
fied in many primate species as well as other mammals such 
as meerkats (Manser 2001) and perhaps most famously, vervet 
monkeys (Seyfarth and Cheney 1993). Several species of birds 
also possess this ability, including ravens (Bugnyar et al. 2001) 
and chickadees (Templeton et al. 2005). These findings con-
tradict previous assumptions that animal signals only contain 
information about the affective state (e.g. frightened or aggres-
sive) or about the physical attributes of the caller (e.g., size or 
health). They further suggest that rather than the receiver’s be-
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havior being a simple reflexive “stimulus-response”, that there 
may be an intervening cognitive step which involves a mental 
representation of the event (Evans 1997). 
Fowl produce four functionally referential signals, two in re-
sponse to predators and two in the context of food. The major 
classes of predators are terrestrial and aerial (McBride et al. 
1969). When a terrestrial predator is detected, both males and 
females produce alarm calls composed of a series of loud, short 
pulses, which alert the group to the predator’s presence. Mem-
bers of the group respond to the call by standing erect, scanning 
the horizon and alarm calling, and may then flee for cover or fly 
into nearby trees. Terrestrial predators typically hunt using am-
bush tactics and are more likely to terminate a hunt if detected. 
The vocalizations may help to coordinate the group’s escape 
behavior and may potentially deter the predator’s attack. The 
response to aerial predators is much more nuanced. Unlike ter-
restrial predators, which rely on stealth to capture their prey, 
aerial predators rely on speed of attack from a distance, which 
means that vocalizing in their presence increases the likelihood 
of being detected and caught. Males hence employ a range of 
risk compensation tactics during an aerial predator encounter 
(Kokolakis et al. 2010). The first is to call only in the presence 
of a female (Wilson and Evans 2008). Although this still in-
creases his risk, it also increases the chances that his mate and 
offspring will survive, thereby benefiting him through “inclu-
sive fitness”. Second, not all calls are equally risky. By vary-
ing the composition and duration of the calls, he can produce 
a call that is difficult for the predator to localize but that will 
still alert his mate (Wood et al. 2000; Bayly and Evans 2003). 
The third factor affecting the likelihood, composition and dura-
tion of the calls is the male’s personal risk. Males gave longer 
duration alarms, which increase the likelihood of signal detec-
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tion by both the female and the predator, when they are close 
to a refuge (and therefore more difficult to catch). They are 
also more likely to call in response to their rival’s call when 
they are protected under the cover of a tree or shrub. Lastly, 
dominant males produce longer calls when their subordinate is 
nearby. By selectively calling when the subordinate is close by, 
the dominant may further reduce his risk of capture by giving 
the predator more than one target (known as the “dilution ef-
fect” for predators choosing between multiple targets (Bertram 
1978) and the “confusion effect” when prey is fleeing (Schradin 
2000)). 
The females’ response to an aerial predator is also very dif-
ferent from their reaction to a terrestrial predator. Females 
crouch down and sleek their feathers and only flee once the 
predator approaches. Females will only aerial alarm call if they 
have chicks to protect. These behaviors reveal how dangerous 
an aerial predator can be and hence the importance of being 
cryptic. 
The discovery of food is another important event about 
which fowl communicate. Upon finding food in the presence 
of a hen, males perform the tidbitting display. This display is 
composed of a series of rhythmic motions and pulsatile vocal-
izations, which are audible up to 30 meters from the male (Da-
vis and Domm 1943). This functionally referential call is in-
dividually distinctive and allows females out of visual contact 
with the male to determine that he has located food (Stokes and 
Williams 1971, 1972; Evans and Evans 1999). The character-
istics of this vocalization (individual distinctiveness and long-
distance audibility) enable another suite of interesting behavior 
in this complex society, including eavesdropping and the use of 
reputation in mate choice. Females prefer to mate with males, 
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regardless of their social rank, that provide food more often 
to any female in the group (Pizzari 2003). In addition, mating 
does not always occur immediately after the tidbitting event. 
This reveals two aspects of the female fowl’s behavior: first 
that females eavesdrop on the food calling behavior of males in 
relation to other females, and second, that they must remember 
the behavior of males to express this mating preference (i.e., 
the individual male’s reputation for providing food). 
The nature of the tidbitting display also creates a third op-
portunity. Because both components of the tidbitting display 
are redundant, a receiver perceiving either component would 
recognize that the signaler is indicating the presence of food. 
The subordinate male exhibits behavioral flexibility that takes 
advantage of this fact. Dominant males respond to a subordi-
nate’s food calling and tidbitting display with overt aggression, 
often chasing the subordinate away from the food and then 
food calling themselves (Stokes and Williams 1972). To avoid 
this aggressive response, subordinate males omit the more 
conspicuous vocalizations and perform only the visual display 
when the dominant male is attentive. When the dominant male 
is distracted, the subordinate performs the combined display, 
which alerts eavesdropping females. This flexibility allows the 
subordinate to reduce the social cost of calling while still at-
tracting a female. This behavior also reveals that the subordi-
nate is sensitive to the attentional state of the alpha male (Smith 
and Evans 2011). 
The referential nature of food calls allows for another sur-
prising behavior: deception. Males occasionally call in the ab-
sence of food (Gyger and Marler 1988). This brings the female 
close to the male where she can be more easily defended from 
other males. Experimental data shows that the females stop 
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responding if the male calls too often in the absence of food 
(Evans and Evans, unpublished data). This provides further 
evidence of the use of long-term memory, eavesdropping and 
reputation in this social system. 
Food calls are also remarkable because they appear to be 
one of the few animal signals that is not only referential, but 
also representational; meaning the behavioral response of the 
listener is mediated specifically by its own information about 
the event (Evans and Evans 2007). It is as if the signal creates 
in the receiver a mental representation of an object or event. 
Significantly, this later capability has only been demonstrated 
in fowl and a few primate species. 
Beyond their sophisticated communication, behavioral flex-
ibility and sensitivity to the attentional state of others, fowl and 
domestic chickens have also been shown to perform a num-
ber of other reputedly cognitively complex capabilities, such 
as transitive inference and social learning. The ability to infer 
the relative status of a series of objects or individuals has been 
suggested to be a measure of logical reasoning ability (Piaget 
1928). Hens observing the interactions of a known status indi-
vidual with an unknown individual are able to infer their own 
status relative to the unknown individual and to respond appro-
priately in future interactions (i.e., dominantly or submissively, 
Beaugrand et al. 1997). Furthermore, chicks tested on an exper-
imental task where series of pairs of items were presented were 
able to infer the relative rank of each item in new pairs relative 
to the established hierarchy (Daisley et al. 2009). These results 
from the social experiments are intriguing because they suggest 
that the birds may be capable of a mental ‘simulation’ of fu-
ture interactions based on their indirect experience with an in-
dividual. Regardless of the underlying cognitive mechanisms, 
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it does appear that the birds are capable of self-assessment and 
comparisons between themselves and others. 
In addition to inferring social relationships, fowl are also 
able to learn from other individuals in the flock (Nicol 2006). 
This social learning can be advantageous in an unpredictable 
environment. It provides the flexibility of individual learning 
but can reduce the costs associated with attempting a new be-
havior (e.g., trying a new type of food) through trial-and-error 
learning. Chicks gain information about palatable food from 
their mother and she in turn changes her behavior in response to 
the competency of her chicks. Adults are also capable of learn-
ing from other adults and appear to do so more from dominant 
individuals (perhaps because dominants are more successful in 
general (i.e., find more food, have more young)) or because 
the birds monitor the dominant’s behavior more closely as de-
scribed above in the case of food calling). Learning through 
either imitation, where the individual copies the knowledgeable 
actor’s motions exactly, or emulation, where a novel method is 
used to obtain the same outcome, are believed to require more 
complex cognitive processes (Zentall 2003; Whiten et al. 2004) 
than trial-and-error learning. However, it has proven notori-
ously difficult to demonstrate conclusively that fowl are using 
either imitation or emulation when learning from the demon-
strator. Nonetheless, it is clear that there is learning. 
3. The evolution of complex cognition and larg-
er brains
Brains are energetically expensive, consuming 20% of the 
daily energy intake of an adult human but accounting for only 
2% of the body weight (Moore 2011). It is hence generally ex-
pected that animals with larger brains will have higher cogni-
tive faculties than those that are less well endowed. However, 
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this assumption raises a host of questions. How should brain 
size be measured? What constitutes higher cognitive skills? 
What were the selective pressures (environmental, social, or 
developmental) that lead to enlargement of the brain (known 
as encephalization)? All of these questions are inter-related and 
the way in which they are approached affects the conclusions 
reached about which animals have higher cognitive skills. 
4. When it comes to brains, how big is big?
There have been many different methods used to measure the 
relative size of animal brains across different taxa (see Healy 
and Rowe 2007 for review). The most direct method is to com-
pare the ratio of the whole brain volume to the volume expected 
for its body size. While this method is relatively straightforward 
and may be useful when comparing within a taxonomic group 
(e.g., primates), environmental constraints may dictate brain 
size more than cognitive function when comparing across taxa. 
For example, bats need to be aerodynamic and lightweight to 
maintain flight capabilities so their brains are neuronaly dense 
but still relatively small, whereas cetaceans have no such con-
straint and have a less dense neuronal structure and are larger 
compared to body size. This method would also not reveal if 
there were trade-offs in different brain regions that kept the 
brain volume the same but increased cognitive function. A sec-
ond approach is to compare the ratio of the volumes of different 
regions of the brain or of the volume of specific regions to the 
volume of the whole brain. It is well known that certain regions 
of the brain perform different functions. The brainstem, which 
includes the hindbrain and midbrain, primarily controls uncon-
scious functions, such as respiration and blood circulation, as 
well as postural control and coordinating motor activity. The 
forebrain, also known as the telencephalon, is associated with 
higher cognitive functions (e.g., learning, memory, language 
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(André Parent 2003; Jarvis 2009)). During development, the 
hindbrain develops first, followed by the forebrain. When com-
paring different species, the majority of the differences appear 
in the forebrain. It is speculated that this is because it is easier 
to modify structures that are still growing later in the devel-
opment (Finley 2009). Although mammalian and avian brains 
differ in their architecture, there are structures that are assumed 
to perform similar functions (Reiner 2005; Herold et al. 2011). 
Researchers often focus on two parts of the telencelphalic sec-
tion of the brain, the hyperstriatum ventrale and neostriatum in 
birds and the isocortex (or neocortex) and striatum in primates 
(Lefebvre et al. 2004). These have been dubbed the “executive” 
brain. This method of comparing specific parts of the brain may 
hence be more revealing regarding the evolution of specific re-
gions in response to selective pressures (Reader and Laland 
2002; Shultz 2010; Lefebvre et al. 2004). However, a region of 
the brain may have multiple functions. This confounds efforts 
to identify specific enlargement of brain areas with increased 
cognitive abilities (Healy and Rowe 2007). All of the methods 
used attempt to correlate encephalization with higher cognition 
as demonstrated by more complex behaviors. 
5. How to measure higher cognition
Behavioral flexibility has been cited as a key indicator of 
social intelligence (Jones 2005) and is associated with com-
plex communication (Tomasello 2008). Behavioral flexibility 
is the ability to deviate from established routines to solve novel 
problems, including innovation (i.e., novel solutions to envi-
ronmental or social problems), social learning (the acquisition 
of information from others), and tool use. A recent study by 
Reader and Laland (2002) examined the behavioral flexibility 
of 116 primate species. They found a positive relationship be-
tween the rate of innovations and tool use as well as in tool use 
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and social learning and brain size (as measured by “executive 
brain” volume ratio to brainstem volume). Similar studies have 
been conducted to compare the foraging innovation rate of dif-
ferent species of birds with their overall brain size (Overington 
et al. 2009). Overington et al. (2009) examined reports of dif-
ferent types of novel feeding techniques (such as tool use, feed-
ing from anthropocentric sites, feeding on new food sources) 
and the number of innovations observed from 803 species in 76 
families (phyllogenetic groups). As expected, birds with larger 
brains exhibited more feeding innovations and a higher diver-
sity of innovation types. 
6. Under pressure: why do animals need to be 
smarter?
Several theories have been proposed to explain the evolu-
tion of complex behavior and complex cognition. The two 
dominant theories focus on environmental or social pressures 
as the drivers of more cognitively complex capabilities. These 
capabilities in turn require conformational changes in the brain 
to enable the performance of ever more demanding cognitive 
tasks.
The ecological hypothesis postulates that complexity or 
variability in the environment was the driver for more com-
plex cognition; spatial navigation through large territories in 
search of ephemeral food sources or the need to hunt moving 
prey required larger brain capacity to meet these demands. 
This environmental variability should also favor species that 
are behaviorally flexible and therefore able to use innovative 
foraging strategies and exhibit other novel behaviors. Evidence 
to support this hypothesis includes the fact that species with 
larger brains tend to be better at invading new habitats and ex-
hibit more novel feeding behaviors than smaller brained spe-
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cies (Overington et al. 2011; Lefebvre et al. 1997). Further evi-
dence comes from primate ecology; fruit-eating primates have 
larger relative brains than leaf-eating primates and species with 
larger home-range size tend to have larger brains. In addition, 
fruits are a high-energy food source that may allow the animals 
that feed upon them to develop larger brains. One potential de-
tractor for this theory is that animals from different taxonomic 
groups but with similar diets living in the same environment do 
not all show similar brain enlargement. This suggests that for-
aging requirements could not be the sole driving force behind 
brain enlargement and complex cognition (Schultz 2010). 
Other researchers have speculated that social structure, in-
cluding group size, strength of social bonds and complexity of 
inter-group relationships, should be positively associated with 
higher cognitive skills (Dunbar and Shultz 2007). There has 
been some strong evidence that the complexity of the relation-
ships is related to brain size. A loose aggregation of individuals, 
such as a flock of birds feeding on seeds or insects, probably 
does not require any difficult negotiations between group mem-
bers. Individuals stay with the group as long as it is beneficial 
to them. However, long term connections, either between pairs 
during parental care, or between multiple individuals of dif-
ferent ranks, may require more long-term memory, the ability 
to infer third-party relationships (e.g., kin, dominance) and the 
need to coordinate group activities, such as foraging or group 
defense (Dunbar and Shultz 2007), as well as a greater ability 
to communicate about external events in the environment. In 
addition, group living creates direct competition with other ani-
mals for similar resources, such as food, shelter and mates. In-
dividuals that can gain additional resources through manipula-
tion or deceptive tactics will benefit more from group member-
ship. This type of behavior creates pressure on individuals to 
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detect and counter deceptive behavior. This leads to a feedback 
loop of ever more complex behavior as individuals continually 
innovate and adapt in order to gain the most benefit from group 
living. The hypothesis that deception and counter-deception 
lead to higher cognition is known as the Machiavellian intel-
ligence hypothesis (Jolly 1966; Humphrey 1976; Byrne and 
Whiten 1988). 
These two hypotheses are by no means mutually exclusive. 
It seems likely that a combination of environmental and social 
factors may have played a role in the evolution of complex cog-
nition. 
7. Where does this leave the chicken?
Red Jungle fowl (Gallus gallus) are the ancestral form of all 
domesticated chickens. These ground-dwelling birds evolved 
in the forests of Indonesia, Ceylon and China. Both males and 
females have a dominance hierarchy. All groups consist of one 
dominant male and one dominant female, subordinates of both 
sexes (up to 12 in the case of females) and juvenile offspring. 
The average fowl social group consists of six individuals. The 
dominant male defends a territory and over the course of the 
day, the group travels around their home range to watering 
holes and food sources, such as termite mounds and fruiting 
trees. This daily mobility creates the opportunity for animals 
to interact with other groups. Group membership is typically 
stable, however juveniles and subordinate males may move be-
tween groups over the course of a season. Chicks are precocial, 
born able to feed themselves, although they require their mother 
for thermoregulation and to gain information about food item 
selection. They gain complete independence from their mother 
at six weeks of age (McBride et al. 1969). 
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Based on the theories put forward to explain the conditions 
under which higher cognition is predicted to have evolved, fowl 
exhibit the expected level of cognitive and behavioral abilities. 
In light of these abilities, chicken brains would be expected to 
show the same pattern of enlargement of specific regions of 
the brain as other birds that exhibit such behaviors, like crows. 
However, most methods of correlating brain characteristics and 
cognition indicate that fowl should be on the lower end of the 
cognitive abilities scale. Using the telencephalon ratio method 
places jungle fowl near the bottom of the list. Of 154 species 
of bird examined, wild jungle fowl ranked 137th (Burish et al. 
2004). 
There are two possible explanations for why chickens ex-
hibit complex cognitive skills but do not measure up in terms 
of brain size or brain ratios. The first possibility is that much 
of what is attributed to complex cognition is actually achieved 
through associative learning or development of a “rule-of-
thumb” based on prior experience. There are several stumbling 
blocks to this explanation. The first is the use of environmental 
and social risk factors when aerial alarm calls are produced. 
The opportunity to learn through observation, particularly dur-
ing dangerous encounters may be very limited. In the case of 
alarm calling where one male is put at risk by the behavior of 
another, it may be more difficult to establish the subtle interac-
tions involved because the outcome may not be immediately 
clear and attempts to observe the interaction may be confound-
ed by the learning animal’s need to hide during the interac-
tion. This behavioral flexibility, as well as their ability to form 
transitive inferences and to into account the attentional state of 
others, suggests that fowl possess a more sophisticated under-
standing of their social interactions. 
Carolynn L. Smith
89
© Between the Species, 2012
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 15, Issue 1
The second possible explanation is that the size and den-
sity of neurons within the brain and the connectivity between 
the different regions of the brain may be more important in 
determining cognitive function than the overall brain volume 
or brain region ratios typically measured. This means that ef-
ficiency or connectivity would be more important than simple 
size (Shultz 2010). Monkeys and apes provide an example of 
this possibility. There are no systematic differences in the great 
apes’ neocortex ratio compared to that of monkeys’ but great 
apes perform behaviors that suggest that they have more cog-
nitive capabilities. Richard Byrne (1997) proposed that this 
greater cognitive ability in great apes was achieved by “soft-
ware adaptations”, meaning a reorganization of how informa-
tion is stored, which did not require structural changes. New 
research into human brain connectivity, called “connectomes”, 
may yield greater insight into how the interconnectedness of 
brain regions maps on to brain functions (Joshi et al. 2010). 
8. Ethical implications
Science cannot answer normative questions; it cannot fur-
nish values to guide ethical decision making. It can however 
provide facts and theories that describe, explain and predict 
elements of the workings of the empirical world and can there-
fore play a role in informing ethical decision making. 
The science outlined in this paper challenges common think-
ing about chickens. Chickens are not mere automata; instead 
they have been shown to possess sophisticated cognitive abili-
ties. Their communication is not simply reflexive, but is re-
sponsive to relevant social and environmental factors. Chick-
ens demonstrate an awareness of themselves as separate from 
others; can recognize particular individuals and appreciate 
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their standing with respect to those individuals; and show an 
awareness of the attentional states of their fellow fowl. Further, 
chickens have been shown to engage in reasoning through per-
forming abstract and social transitive inferences. This grow-
ing body of scientific data could inform a rethinking about the 
treatment of these animals. 
Broiler or meat chickens are typically housed in 100 meter 
by 12 meter sheds with between 20,000 and 50,000 animals 
per shed (Robinson and Hulme 2004). At a maximum stock-
ing density this translates into almost 42 birds per square me-
ter of space. Meat chickens have been selectively bred for fast 
growth, such that when they are slaughtered at 6 weeks of age 
(the age at which a wild chicken would just become indepen-
dent from its mother), these birds weigh more than their adult 
wild counterparts. Research has also shown that because of 
their exceptionally high rate of growth and weight gain there 
is a high potential for leg fractures, foot problems, heart failure 
and other serious conditions, such as obesity, prior to slaughter. 
In order to prevent these problems, young broiler birds must 
be kept on a severely calorically restricted diet, which means 
they suffer from extreme hunger (Duncan 2010). Male chick-
ens hatched in the egg-laying and meat industry production are 
killed on the day they hatch by maceration because they are 
unsuitable for either industry. 
The facts surrounding the housing of hens in the egg-laying 
industry are similar to those in the meat industry. Approximate-
ly 90% of the commercial eggs laid are in “cage” systems. In 
the conventional cage system, each bird gets 400 cm2 of unre-
stricted floor space but no nest boxes, litter for foraging or dust 
bathing or perches (CSIRO 2002). High stocking density and 
the lack of environmental enrichment leads to aberrant behav-
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ior, such as feather pecking and cannibalism. In response to 
these problems, the beaks of the birds are routinely trimmed 
using hot blades or lasers. These procedures can lead to chronic 
pain for the life of the bird. The European Union has banned 
unenriched cages as of January 1, 2012 and will require at 
least 600 cm2 of cage area per hen (European Union Directive 
1999/74/EC). As consumers become more aware of the facts 
regarding these intensive farming systems, other housing sys-
tems, such as “barn-laid” and “free-range” systems for egg 
production are becoming more popular. This change in buy-
ing behavior based on a perception of improved animal welfare 
suggests a change in the public’s attitude towards the treatment 
of farmed animals. 
Intensive farming practices have made chickens cheaper 
and more readily available for human consumption. However 
these intensive production systems cause some birds to have 
chronic pain; others to have their legs break under their own 
weight or to be attacked or killed by their cage mates. If, as 
some philosophers have argued, moral standing is grounded in 
the possession of such capacities as communication, awareness 
and rationality, then we have provided evidence that suggests 
chickens merit at least some moral consideration. And if they 
do, then the physical, social and psychological harms routinely 
inflicted on them through their use in meat and egg production 
are made problematic. 
Scientific research into animal welfare can inform changes 
in the intensive farming systems that may reduce the likelihood 
of these physiologically adverse events. However, as suggested 
by Bryant (2007) and others, there is a significant tension at 
play here. In order to establish that nonhuman animals have 
ethical worth grounded in their possession of certain capacities 
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and to understand what constitutes good practice toward them, 
scientific experimentation is required, yet experimentation on 
nonhuman animals is in itself ethically problematic. In the case 
of chickens, much of what is known about their capabilities has 
been learned through captive studies, since fowl, like most spe-
cies, are cryptic in the wild. It is very difficult to track individu-
als and to record their social interactions. Although observa-
tions of animals in the wild provide the basis of our understand-
ing of natural behavior, these natural settings limit the types of 
experiments possible and level of experimental control. This 
may therefore reduce the strength of conclusions that can be 
drawn.
Whenever captive animals are used in research in Australia 
and many other similar jurisdictions, the scientists must adhere 
to the 3Rs. These require, where possible, the Replacement of 
animals in research, Reduction in the number of animals used 
and Refinement of techniques and technologies used in order 
to minimize pain and suffering and to avoid “death as an end-
point” (i.e., euthanasia at the completion of the experiment). 
A notable feature of the experimental work with chickens is 
the extent to which these researchers have rigorously applied 
the 3Rs and in fact gone beyond these principles. For example, 
live chickens have been replaced with 3D animated animals in 
some experiments. This refinement of the experimental method 
enables behavioral and physical characteristics to be manipu-
lated on an animated virtual bird without harming a live one. 
Birds react naturally to the animation and the animation pro-
vides precise control over the virtual bird’s actions (Smith et 
al. 2009). This also reduces the number of birds that need to 
be held in captivity since the animation can be changed to suit 
each new experiment. 
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Furthermore, those who do research with chickens have be-
gun to pursue a new interpretation of the 3rd R (Refinement). 
Because chickens have a fast reproductive cycle new animals 
can be sourced on a constant basis, nonetheless researchers go 
to great lengths to avoid “death as an end-point” for their study 
subjects. This new approach involves Retiring experimental 
animals to places outside of the research realm. Researchers 
frequently find good homes for their animals, including adopt-
ing out the birds to chicken fanciers (people who raise and 
show them at competitions or simply keep them as pets), or 
donating them to zoos for exhibition. Though the suggestion 
of re-homing experimental animals might seem far-fetched, 
this principle has been raised in recent public consultations 
on revisions to the “Australian Code for the Care and Use of 
Animals for Scientific Purposes” (National Health and Medical 
Research Council 2011, section 3.9.3).
9. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that recent experimental work 
with chickens demonstrates they are much more cognitively 
complex than previously thought. We have explained how this 
research demonstrates the difficulty in measuring cognitive 
abilities and the ongoing challenge of linking cognitive func-
tion to brain architecture. We have also discussed how those 
who do research with chickens go beyond what is mandated by 
the current “Code of Practice” and frequently re-home their ex-
perimental animals. We maintain that the re-homing of experi-
mental animals could profitably be explored in other behavioral 
research settings and recognize that some researchers on other 
species have also taken the initiative in this area. Finally, al-
though there is the question whether the ethical treatment of 
an animal should be tied to its cognitive ability, we think that 
the research we have discussed may provide a new perspective 
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for the public on the manner in which chickens are raised and 
routinely killed to suit human dietary desires. 
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